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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 changed the U.S.
welfare system dramatically. Its primary goal was to reduce dependency by moving most of those
receiving cash welfare into the work force. One tool to accomplish this objective was a change in the
incentives facing actual and potential recipients. States were granted flexibility in how to accomplish this
objective. This paper evaluates the program in four states in terms of efficiency and equity. It looks
briefly at resulting labor force participation and incomes of those most directly affected by welfare
reforms. The analysis highlights the difficulty of simultaneously providing incentives to work and
incentives to increase individuals’ labor market productivity while maintaining a minimal safety net and
avoiding high marginal rates of taxation. None of the states studied is able to avoid a “poverty trap” in its
program. The need to coordinate the benefit and withdrawal schedule of programs designed to help this
population flows from the analysis.Incentives, Challenges, and Dilemmas of TANF
The welfare system in the United States changed dramatically in 1996 with passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. The primary goal of the reform
enacted then was to reduce dependency on the system by moving those on the rolls into the work force.
Other goals included making both parents responsible for their children, decreasing teen pregnancy and
births, and shifting responsibility for welfare to the states. The reform eliminated the cash assistance
component of the welfare system, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), eliminated cash
payments to parents younger than 18, and expanded the employee-based subsidy for work. It also
encouraged states to establish programs providing assistance to enable parents to work. As a result, the
incentives facing low-skilled individuals have been altered. This paper evaluates the resulting efficiency
and equity consequences for welfare recipients and those who would have been recipients. It then looks
briefly at the labor force participation and incomes of those directly affected by the welfare reform and
concludes by identifying a few programs that states and perhaps other countries may wish to consider in
rethinking their social welfare programs. The emphasis is on programs that attempt to defy the traditional
equity-efficiency trade-off.
To evaluate the success of welfare reform in changing incentives toward work, I first discuss the
incentives of the “old” system, described in detail in Appendix A. I then compare these incentives to
those of the new system, a nontrivial task, because each state has its own version of the program,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which replaced AFDC. Less generous versus more
generous states are highlighted. How these incentives change if the head of the recipient unit reaches a
time limit is discussed. The incentives in Wisconsin, the state that many see as a model for welfare
reform in the United States, are considered in more detail. Whether the new programs can avoid a
“poverty trap,” the point at which marginal tax rates are so high that they discourage work effort, is a
focus of the discussion.2
1The vast majority of cases on AFDC were single-parent families with a dependent child under age 18. A
much smaller program, AFDC-UP, existed for two-parent families in which the principal breadwinner was
unemployed.
2This is calculated for an earnings disregard of $30 plus one-third of earnings. In addition, the employee’s
share of payroll taxes is subtracted from earnings, so that the marginal tax rate equals .69.
THE OLD SYSTEM
The old welfare system was a cash assistance program primarily for single parents with
dependent children, and benefits were based on family size.
1 Figure 1 provides an illustration for one
state, Pennsylvania. A 45-degree line compares family income on the vertical axis to earnings on the
horizontal axis for a family consisting of a single parent and two children, one of whom is assumed to be
younger than school age and the other to be of school age (6 or older). All dollar values are inflated to
1999 dollars; the parameters are for the system in place in 1996. The lowest line, showing cash benefits
(AFDC) plus earnings, demonstrates how this changes as earnings increase. (If income exactly mirrored
earnings, all points on the graph would be on the 45-degree line.) In this typical state, whose benefit
structure lies near the U.S. average, a three-person family would receive approximately $5,400 a year.
(Note that larger families would get more, because cash benefits were conditional on family size.) As a
single parent started to work, she could keep the first $30 of earnings per month and then her AFDC
grant was reduced by two-thirds (67 cents) for every dollar, so that she soon faced a marginal tax rate of
more than 69 percent, since the payroll tax also reduced take-home pay.
2 Soon, however, that rate rises to
93 percent, meaning that she loses nearly a dollar in her grant for each dollar earned. Beyond about
$8,500, income depends solely on earnings, because she is no longer eligible for cash benefits.
The typical welfare family would be eligible for other noncash benefits, including Food Stamps
(vouchers to buy food, which depend on income and family size); health insurance (Medicaid) for allFIGURE 1
Welfare, Earnings, and Income of a Single Parent with Two Children: 





































AFDC, earnings, Food Stamps and Medicaid
AFDC, earnings, Food Stamps, Medicaid and EITC
Series2
Source: Author's calculations based on data from 1998 Green Book.
Notes: The AFDC benefit calculation includes a baseline deduction of $30, a $10 deduction for child care, and a deduction for transportation 
expenses which amounts to 10% of total earnings.
Food Stamps are calculated with the following formula: {[$313 - 0.3*((earnings - $134/month)- (earnings*0.4))] - 0.3*AFDC benefit}.
State tax calculations include a substantial "tax foregiveness credit" for lower income cohorts.
Data are inflated to August 1999.




































3In 1995, expenditures on AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on
behalf of nondisabled working-age families were more than $100 billion, or about 1.4 percent of the U.S. GDP. Of
this, AFDC accounted for $22 billion, Food Stamps for $18.5 billion, Medicaid for $36 billion, and the EITC for
about $25 billion.
4Food Stamps are valued at their cash value and Medicaid at two times the average expenditure per child
and one times the average expenditure per nonelderly, nondisabled adult in this state. This understates the value of
Medicaid for some families and overvalues it for others, as it captures average spending, which might be greater or
less than the amount this family consumes—greater than the family would consume if it were not fully subsidized. It
does not capture the insurance value of health care coverage.
5Rather than model the budget constraint as one with “sharp edges,” in which the exact dollar of earnings at
which an individual loses Medicaid eligibility is shown, the budget constraint here is smoothed. This is the author’s
preferred approach, because eligibility is determined on a monthly basis and individuals are likely to know, in
general, about eligibility rather than know that if they work one more hour they will lose benefits.
6If the family received housing assistance, the marginal tax rates would be even higher, as housing accounts
for 30 cents for every dollar increase in earnings.
members of the family, another categorical program; and a housing benefit (available to about 30 percent
of this population).
3
This combination of programs (excluding the Earned Income Tax Credit, discussed below, and
housing assistance) is captured by the middle line of Figure 1, showing the result of a set of programs
that were income-conditioned.
4 As a woman begins to work, she at first faces a marginal tax rate of about
63 percent (which includes the payroll tax), but this quickly increases to more than 100 percent as
benefits are reduced. As her earnings increase and the AFDC benefit is reduced, she soon loses eligibility
for Medicaid;
5 then, as her earnings increase further, her older child also loses Medicaid coverage and, as
family income reaches the poverty line, Food Stamps are reduced substantially. By the time the woman’s
earnings reach $15,000 she faces a marginal tax rate of more than 125 percent, as she begins to pay
federal income taxes, loses eligibility for Food Stamps, and the youngest child loses Medicaid coverage.
This line portrays the poverty trap—as a woman earns more, her family income (including the value of
benefits in kind) increases very gradually, if at all.
6 Once all benefits have been eliminated and the
woman’s earnings are at about 160 percent of the poverty line, she faces a much lower marginal tax rate,
27 percent.5
7The EITC was initially enacted in 1975 as a means of tax relief; it has been expanded three times, in 1986,
1990, and 1993.
8For a family with one child, the EITC supplemented earnings at a 34 percent rate up to a maximum credit
of $2,152 and was fully phased out at about $25,000 of earnings.
9As of 1993 the EITC was less generous. Earnings up to $7,750 were subsidized at a rate of 20 percent for
families with one or more children. After earnings reached $12,200, the subsidy was gradually clawed back. By
$23,050, the EITC was entirely clawed back.
10One could view the incomes at which each family member loses Medicaid as “notches,” marking an
immediate shift to lower family income.
An exception to this set of incentives, one which increases the gain to work, is the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC).
7 This credit is paid only to those with children and with earnings. The top
line of Figure 1 illustrates the effect of including the EITC as earnings increase. Over much of the range
the EITC lowers the marginal tax rates, but as the EITC is reduced, marginal tax rates increase. As of
1996, as a result of changes passed in 1993, the EITC rewarded earnings of individuals with two or more
dependent children at a 40 percent rate, reaching a maximum of $3,556 ($3,816 in 1999 dollars) when a
family with two or more children received wages of $8,890, then remained flat until earnings reached
$11,610, just below the poverty line. After this the EITC was “clawed back” at a rate of about 21 percent,
and was fully phased out at earnings of $28,490.
8 (Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show the parameters of
the EITC in 1993 and 1999.) The top line of Figure 1 shows the budget constraint of an AFDC recipient
with two children including the EITC, as of 1996.
9 The EITC provided a substantial increase in income
among low-earning families with children. It made work pay, over a limited range.
Even with the EITC, this recipient family faced substantial marginal tax rates as earnings
increased. After an initial range in which the marginal tax rate was a relatively low 24 percent, the rate
increased to nearly 100 percent as the mother lost Medicaid coverage. All three points (see Figure 1) at
which eligibility for Medicaid is lost have extremely high rates.
10 And just beyond the poverty line (again
see Figure 1), the marginal tax rates facing this family are increased as the EITC is clawed back, in
addition to a reduction in Food Stamps and loss of Medicaid for the youngest child. It is not difficult to6
11Table 2, below, compares AFDC and TANF in Pennsylvania.
12In order to change the parameters of the state AFDC program, states had to obtain a federal waiver under
the cost-sharing arrangement for AFDC.
13Wisconsin’s waiver programs were Self-Sufficiency First and Pay for Performance.
see why the program was disliked. It provided clear incentives to forgo work; its benefits were primarily
paid to single parents and were thought to increase family breakup and illegitimacy. The program also
did not eliminate poverty.
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THE NEW SYSTEM
Recognition of these negative incentives, combined with continued poverty, led to frustration and
attempts to modify the system. Substantial changes resulted from the Family Support Act of 1988, which
provided an entitlement to child care subsidies for AFDC recipients who entered the work force, required
about 10 percent of recipients to enter a program of work or training, and offered a one-year extension of
Medicaid (health insurance) for those who left AFDC because of increased earnings. In subsequent years
states requested waivers from the federal government to experiment with alternative policies,
12 and
various research groups evaluated these demonstrations. Wisconsin made significant changes under its
waivers, and ultimately eliminated AFDC altogether. In early 1996 the state set up programs in a number
of counties that attempted to move welfare recipients into employment and divert new applicants directly
to work.
13 Under the state’s current TANF program, Wisconsin Works (W-2), cash assistance is
eliminated and all who receive assistance must work.
The general emphasis of the 1996 federal reform legislation is on getting recipients and would-be
recipients into the work force. The message is that individuals must ultimately be self-reliant. The 1996
federal law:
• Ended entitlement to AFDC.7
14States can use their own funds to provide assistance beyond 60 months. Michigan and Rhode Island plan
to do so. Illinois will do so for families with earned income from working a minimum of 20 hours per week.
• Allowed each state to determine how it would treat its low-income population, subject to
certain constraints. Funding was through block grants, whose amounts were based on
historical expenditures.
• Established an expectation that most heads of families were to work within two years.
• Established a federal five-year limit for the receipt of cash assistance; states were
permitted to impose shorter time limits.
14
• Prohibited states from providing cash assistance to unmarried teens (under age 18) unless
the mother stayed in school and lived with an adult.
• Required mothers of children older than 12 months to work, while allowing states to set
stricter requirements.
• Prohibited the use of federal funds for assistance to immigrants, and set tighter eligibility
requirements for the program for disabled individuals (SSI).
• Set limits on counting participation in vocational education as meeting work
requirements.
Over time, states are required to meet certain reductions in their caseloads. Within these limits,
states are given a great deal of flexibility.
Associated with, but not a direct part of, the welfare policy change was the expansion of the
EITC, especially for families with two or more children, and an increase in the minimum wage. A
comparison of the generosity of minimum wages and the EITC is presented in Table 1. The last row of
the table sums up the potential impact of these changes for a three-person family headed by a single
parent. If the parent worked full-time, full-year at a minimum-wage job, paid payroll taxes, and received
the EITC, her income from these sources would have increased from 78 percent to 96 percent of the
three-person poverty line. These changes are consistent with the goals of welfare reform and should work
to further the work-not-welfare policy.8
TABLE 1
Potential Impact of Raising the Minimum Wage and EITC
on Income and Poverty of Three-Person, Single-Parent Families (1999 Dollars)
1993 1997 1999
Minimum wage $4.89 $5.33 $5.15
Maximum EITC, two-child family $1,738 $3,786 $3,816
Minimum wage earnings, FTFY $9,780 $10,660 $10,300
Minimum wage + EITC $11,518 $14,446 $14,116
Minimum wage + EITC  payroll tax $10,777 $13,636 $13,328
Ratio to three-person poverty line 0.776 0.98 0.969
15Payroll taxes reduce earnings by an additional 7.65 percent.
16Or alternatively, as her wage rate per hour increases, while working similar hours.
Did the changes substantially alter incentives? Does work pay under the new system? Figure 2
provides a picture of the effects of these changes. The analysis starts with the same typical state,
Pennsylvania, as in Figure 1, and again uses a three-person family. Dollars are in 1999 values.
We assume that the family is eligible to receive cash assistance and has not been sanctioned. The
bottom line shows the link between receipt of cash assistance (TANF monies), earnings, and taxes. The
base amount the family would receive if it had no earnings, $5,060, is somewhat less than under AFDC.
The amount the family keeps as the recipient works is about 45 percent. The incentives to work are
clearly greater than they were under AFDC.
15 The top line adds the value of Food Stamps, Medicaid, and
the EITC. Without work the family would receive benefits equal to $13,367. The figure illustrates that as
a recipient works up to 1,000 hours per year at the minimum wage, the family’s income increases at a
rate of about 0.69 for each dollar earned. This is well above the 0.47 to 0.43 under the old system, so the
incentive to work is improved relative to the former system. Income while working half-time at the
minimum wage is 127 percent of income if not working. But the incentive problem worsens beyond this
level of work effort. As the recipient increases hours of work from 1,000 to 1,750,
16 she faces a marginal
tax rate of 0.95, so that for every dollar she earns, family income only increases by 5 cents. The poverty
trap has not been eliminated. After about $9,000 in earnings, the marginal tax rate varies from 0.69 to
more than 1.00 up to about $9.00 per hour ($18,000 per year) at a full-time, full-year job. Beyond this
earnings level, her marginal tax rate declines to .40, reflecting federal payroll and income taxes,
Pennsylvania taxes, and reductions in the EITC.
The explanation for the very high rates that begin with half-time work at the minimum wage lies
in benefit reduction in cash assistance, Food Stamps, EITC, and Medicaid. Federal income taxes do not
play any role until income rises to the poverty line ($13,880 for a family of three). Payroll taxes accountFIGURE 2
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TANF, earnings, federal, state, and local taxes.
TANF, earnings, taxes, EITC, Food Stamps, Medicaid.
TANF, earnings, taxes, EITC, Food Stamps, Medicaid, child care.
Series4
Source: http://newfederalism.urban.org/incalc2/index.html and author's calculations based on data from 1998 Green Book.
Notes:  See Figure 1.
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17In this analysis only the employee’s share of FICA is subtracted from the employee’s wages.
for a marginal tax rate of 7.65 percent over all earnings in the range under analysis.
17 The EITC adds to
earnings throughout the full range reported here. It reaches a maximum of $3,816 for families with two or
more children at $9,540 of earnings, remains at that level until earnings reach $12,460, then gradually
decreases. At an earnings level of $30,580 the EITC is phased out.
The result is that a prototypical family of three in Pennsylvania after the 1996 welfare reform has
higher income as earnings rise to about $10,500 than prior to reform. However, after this earnings level,
marginal tax rates are stronger (see Table 2). In Figure 2, the middle line (stars) includes the cost of child
care needed if this woman is to work. Initially the state subsidizes child care, but as earnings increase that
subsidy is reduced and finally is terminated. The line subtracts the average cost of child care for children
under age 5 and ages 6–11 (the average cost paid minus the state subsidy). This cost increases from $650
to $4,128 as earnings increase. The phaseout of the child care subsidy occurs after the phasing out of
TANF, Food Stamps, and Medicaid. This coordination avoids even higher marginal tax rates at lower
levels of earnings.
Figure 3 illustrates the incentives facing a similar woman in a less generous state, Indiana. The
lowest line shows that the base cash grant for a three-person family in Indiana is $3,436, about two-thirds
of the amount in Pennsylvania. The lower amount makes it easier to have lower marginal tax rates; in
other words, if the base grant is low, there is less to be reduced and hence marginal tax rates can be
lower. The top line adds the same benefits as for Pennsylvania: EITC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid.
Income without work is $11,731 for this three-person family. The figure shows that as earnings increase,
the marginal tax rate for those first dollars of earnings is .27, meaning that the woman adds 73 cents for
every dollar earned. However, once she works 20 hours per week at the minimum wage, additional
earnings face a much higher marginal tax rate—80 percent. And again, over the range of increasedEarnings (1999 $)










TANF, earnings, federal, state, and local taxes (Y1)
TANF, earnings, taxes, EITC, Food Stamps, Medicaid (Y1)
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by the Urban Institute’s 1998 State TANF Income Calculator.
Notes: See Figure 1.13
earnings till about $9 per hour working full-time, full-year, the marginal tax rates are very high. They
vary between a low of 49 percent and a high of 114 percent.
Once all of these benefits have been phased out, the marginal tax rate again is 49 percent. The
starred line shows the additional impact of subtracting child care expenses net of any subsidy. The
overall picture is troublesome; the poverty trap is very much in evidence. There is less disincentive to
work during the first 1,000 hours per year at minimum wage, but thereafter taxes are high and remain so
until income rises above $18,000. Near the poverty line, marginal tax rates are extremely high, reaching
more than 100 percent.
Figure 4 is for a more generous state, California. The base TANF cash grant here is considerably
higher than in either Pennsylvania or Indiana. A woman who does not work is eligible for benefits equal
to $14,561. A commitment to creating positive incentives to work is indicated by the willingness of the
state to pay cash grants to those who work full-time, full-year up to about $6.00 per hour. The top line
shows that the state has avoided disincentives to work over the interval of zero to about $5,000, where
the combined marginal tax rate is 22 percent, so that the parent keeps 78 cents of every dollar earned.
However, beyond this level, the greater generosity of the state leads to even higher marginal tax rates
than in the other two states we analyzed, because the base grant plus Medicaid and Food Stamps are
reduced over a narrower interval of earnings. The result is marginal tax rates that range from 76 to 132
percent, and rates are above 100 percent over much of the range till about $19,000. Greater generosity in
child care subsidies is noted as well. The top line and the starred line (which subtracts child care
expenses) overlap up to about $19,000, reflecting the generous child care subsidies in the California
system. Even with this, TANF recipients gain little in terms of family income when their earnings reach
$20,000. The state has not developed a program that entirely avoids a poverty trap.
An alternative approach to understanding these programs is shown in Table 2, which plots
income ratios as earnings increase in the three states. Most startling in this table is how little incentivesEarnings (1999 $)










TANF, earnings, federal, state, and local taxes (Y1)
TANF, earnings, taxes, EITC, Food Stamps, Medicaid (Y1)
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.95 .76 1.32
1.13 1.03 1.14 .49
.49
.22
Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by the Urban Institute’s 1998 State TANF Income Calculator.
Notes: See Figure 1.TABLE 2
Comparison of Income and Income Ratios under AFDC and TANF Programs
                            Pennsylvania                                    Indiana             California      
AFDC TANF TANF TANF
Income without Work $12,211.17 $13,367.44 $11,731.29 $14,560.72
Income Ratios
At earnings of $5.15/hour
(half-time) relative to no work 1.278 1.274 1.353 1.299
At earnings of $5.15/hour
(full-time) relative to $5.15/hour (half-time) 1.039 1.021 1.062 1.018
At earnings of $6/hour
(full time) relative to $5.15/hour (full-time) 1.113 0.992 0.989 0.967
At earnings of $7/hour relative to
$6/hour (full-time) 1.049 1.028 1.037 0.993
At earnings of $8/hour relative to
$7/hour (full-time) 0.945 1.036 1.032 0.992
At earnings of $10/hour relative to
$8/hour (full-time) 1.067 1.036 1.041 1.037
At earnings of $12/hour relative to
$10/hour (full-time) 1.116 1.097 1.115 1.117
Note: Income includes AFDC/TANF, earnings, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and EITC.16
18Wisconsin is one of seven states that offer a refundable credit.
have changed under welfare reform. The difficulty in providing income-conditioned benefits remains;
reduction of benefits as earnings rise results in very high marginal tax rates, far in excess of what higher-
earning families pay.
The Wisconsin System
Finally we turn to a state that offers no cash benefits unless an individual works, Wisconsin.
Wisconsin Works, or W-2, requires all recipients of welfare assistance to engage in work or a worklike
activity. A self-sufficiency ladder establishes four levels of activity. The highest level is unsubsidized
employment, in which the recipient works in the private sector and receives a market wage greater than
or equal to the minimum wage, plus the federal and state EITC and Food Stamps, as long as the parent is
income- and asset-eligible.
18 The next level is Trial Jobs, in which the state pays a subsidy to employers
to hire a TANF participant and the individual receives at least the minimum wage, plus the federal and
state EITC and Food Stamps. Forty hours of work per week are required. The third tier is Community
Service Jobs, for those not yet able to hold a private sector job. These individuals are required to work 30
hours per week and may obtain training or work an additional 10 hours per week. In this tier the
individual is not eligible for the EITC, because she receives a grant rather than earnings, but is eligible
for Food Stamps. Finally, for those least able to work, the bottom tier is W-2 Transitions, which requires
28 hours per week of productive activity and 12 hours of training. This also involves a grant, permitting
receipt of Food Stamps but not the EITC. Activities in this tier may include care of a disabled child or
parent. Thus all W-2 participants are required to work, and Tiers 3 and 4 ensure that there is a “job” for
everyone. Mothers of newborn infants are exempt from these work requirements until the infant is 12
weeks old.17
Everyone in W-2 has an opportunity for gainful employment and nearly everyone faces pressure
to work. Those who do not fully participate are sanctioned at a rate of $5.25 per hour (the minimum
wage) of missed required activity. Beyond wages, EITC, and Food Stamps, the state offers assistance in
the form of subsidized health insurance to families with incomes below 185 percent of the poverty line,
child care assistance, and transportation assistance. There is an attempt to provide tailor-made
management in the form of job center assistance that helps coordinate benefits, obtain child support from
absentee parents, and obtain health insurance, and that offers relevant referrals and provides short-term
loans.
Figure 5 illustrates the incentives of the Wisconsin program for an individual starting in Tier 3,
Community Service Jobs. This job provides the mother and her family with $8,076 per year in cash
income. The lowest line shows what would happen if she moved up to Tier 2 and received the minimum
wage. Her cash income would increase only modestly if she worked 20 hours per week—to $9,354, or by
15.8 percent. However, she would receive the EITC, so her income would increase more dramatically.
The top line shows her full income as she moves from Tier 3 to Tier 2 and then Tier 1.
The top line indicates that this woman would face a marginal tax rate of 39 percent on the first
dollars of earnings in Tiers 1 or 2, followed by a much higher marginal tax rate of 59 percent as she
moves from $5,500 to $9,500, a slightly lower rate of 47 and 55 percent up to about $14,500 of earnings,
followed by a very high 94 percent marginal tax rate up to about $19,000, or about 140 percent of the
poverty line. After this level of earnings she faces marginal rates of about 84–88 percent up to more than
$20,000 in earnings and a rate of 73 percent to about $29,000 in earnings, still extremely high relative to
that of others in the economy. Again, the system has a “poverty trap,” though it does not fully hit until
earnings are at about the poverty line. The trap is postponed, but not eliminated. The starred line shows
































TANF, earnings, fed, state, local taxes
TANF, earnings, taxes, EITC, food stamps, Medicaid
TANF, earnings, taxes, EITC, food stamps, Medicaid, childcare
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when earnings are between $6.20 and $9.30, and increases the trap as the subsidy is fully withdrawn at an
income about 160 percent of the poverty line.
Time Limits
Figure 6 shows what happens if an individual in Wisconsin reaches the time limit and is no
longer eligible for jobs in Tiers 3 or 4. This can be viewed as the long-run situation facing current
recipients in Wisconsin. The lowest line, which combines TANF grants and earnings, begins at zero for
those without earnings. The top line shows that Food Stamps and Medicaid would continue. But the
important points illustrated here are (1) that it is far easier to set up a program with very low marginal tax
rates if there are no (or very low) cash grants, and (2) that eventually the marginal tax rates become very
high and create a “poverty trap.” The top line shows the full impact of the EITC for an individual who
faces a negative marginal tax rate as she begins to work. The 28 percent means that for every dollar the
woman earns, her family income increases by $1.28. Beyond this initial level, the rate she faces remains
negative at 7 percent up to an earnings level of about $9,300. After this, her marginal tax rate increases
so that by the time her earnings reach about $12,500, or about $6.00 per hour working full-time, full-year,
she faces very high rates. These high marginal tax rates last through earnings of about $21,500, or about
$11.00 per hour working full-time, full-year. Beyond this earnings level the rates remain high, at 57
percent and 65 percent, without taking child care into account. This illustrates the “iron law”: A program
that provides targeted cash benefits must reduce these benefits as income rises, leading to high marginal
tax rates, which discourage work effort.
The current form of child care subsidy (starred line) only accentuates this pattern. The starred
lines in the figures above take child care into account by assuming that the state subsidy is accepted by
all eligible families and that when the family is no longer eligible it will pay the state average cost for
one preschool-age child and one school-age child requiring only after-school and vacation child care.
Among families with an infant, the cost of care is far greater, so that losing the state subsidy would raiseEarnings (1999 $)
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19Estimates in this paragraph are based on Wisconsin administrative data for April and May 1999.
20For a family with one child the claw-back rate is below 16 percent. The lower tax rate on their credit is
tied to the lower maximum credit. The maximum credit for a family with one child is about 60 percent of that of a
two-child family.
the marginal tax rate considerably. For example, among Wisconsin low-income families with a child
under age 2 receiving subsidies, the monthly cost of child care in spring 1999 was about $535. Families
receiving state subsidies paid $42 on average, and the state paid $494. Families with incomes below 165
percent of the poverty line are eligible for the subsidy, and eligibility can continue up to 200 percent of
the poverty line. The maximum payment is limited to 16 percent of gross income under the subsidy
program. Loss of the subsidy would require this family to pay an annual amount for infant care equal to
nearly 50 percent of the three-person poverty line.
19 In California, the average monthly cost of infant day
care in 1998 was $585, more than 50 percent of the three-person poverty line (see Adams, Schulman, and
Ebb, 1998, for more on the challenge posed by child care).
Thus we see that a system of multiple assistance programs targeted on the poor reduces the
incentive to work longer hours. This is so even in the face of an expanded EITC, which is specifically
designed to make work pay, is targeted on families with children, and has a rather low claw-back rate of
21 percent that begins at an hourly wage rate of about $6.23 (full-time, full-year) and continues to an
hourly rate of $15.29 (full-time, full-year), or about 220 percent of the poverty line for a three-person
family.
20 (See Figure A2 for the exact 1999 parameters of the EITC program.) More coordination of
benefits might reduce the intensity of the poverty trap, but only more universal benefits are likely to
significantly reduce the very high marginal tax rates facing the poor. It is possible to reduce these very
high rates if we were to modify some of the benefit schemes of TANF. For example, a state could
provide health insurance, either on a universal basis, by subsidizing it for all persons, or by withdrawing
the subsidy after withdrawal of the EITC. The latter might be accomplished using a tax-refundable credit.
Figures A3 to A5 show how incentives would change in Indiana, California, and Wisconsin if all persons22
21Working, including working full-time, does not assure that individuals will have coverage. It is even less
likely that their families will have employer-based coverage. Over all poor families in 1998, 47.5 percent of full-time
workers were without coverage for the entire year (http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p60-208.pdf). There are
many reasons for low coverage: working for firms that do not offer coverage, not being eligible for a firm’s
coverage, or declining a firm’s coverage due to substantial cost-sharing requirements. Lower-wage workers receive
lower tax subsidies for private employer-based coverage, as the subsidy depends on one’s marginal tax rate. (See
Vanness and Wolfe, 1999, for more on employer-based coverage and coverage of low-skilled workers.) Those
working part-time rarely receive health benefits. In 1994, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that only 5 percent
of part-time workers in firms of 100 or fewer employees received health benefits (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1994).
(at least up to earnings of $28,000) were provided with health care insurance coverage without having to
pay a premium or additional taxes. The work disincentives resulting from high marginal tax rates are
clearly reduced and, while high rates remain, they are not even close to the much higher rates that result
from income-conditioned medical care. A similar result could be achieved if all individuals and their
families were provided health insurance at their place of employment with little or no cost-sharing
required.
21 The children’s health insurance programs (CHIP) change the income level at which children
lose eligibility for subsidized insurance. CHIP does not change eligibility for adults. The only exception
to this is the state of Wisconsin, which has a waiver to provide coverage to adults as well in its expanded
CHIP program, BadgerCare. Table 3 shows the Medicaid eligibility levels and CHIP coverage as of
1999. The notes provide required payments for premiums and services. These programs are not yet
incorporated in much of the analysis here, as take-up rates are not yet clear and eligibility formulas can
be complicated and interact with employer-offered coverage.
Child Care
One of the most difficult issues in moving families off welfare and into work concerns child care.
Child care is expensive and, unless subsidized, greatly reduces the take-home income of poor single-
parent families, potentially making them worse off financially than if they did not work at all. In the
figures above, the starred line represents income minus child care costs, after taking account of stateTABLE 3
Medicaid Eligibility Levels and CHIP Coverage in Selected States, 1999
            Medicaid Eligibility (pre-CHIP)                                   CHIP Coverage by Age                    
State 0–1 1–6 6–14 14–18 0–1 1–6 6–14 15–18
Pennsylvania
a 185% 133% 100% 39% 235% 235% 235% 235%
Indiana
b 185% 133% 100% 100% 150% 150% 150%
California
c 200% 133% 100% 85% 250% 200% 200% 200%
Wisconsin
d 185% 185% 100% 185% 185% 185% 185%
aFamilies with incomes between 200 and 235 percent of the poverty line pay half the cost of premium for children.
bNo premium imposed currently, but that will change if proposed expansion is approved.
cAges 0–1: premiums 2% of family income; ages 1–19: 100–150% of poverty line, $7/month for one child, $14/month for two children;
150–200% of poverty line, $9/month for one child, $18/month for two children. Copayments: $5 for most services with a $250 annual cap.
dParents of children covered by CHIP also covered; families can remain in program until incomes reach 200% of poverty line, at 150%+ of
poverty line, premiums 3–3.5% of family income.24
22Under the 1996 welfare law, the federal government estimates that 14.7 million children would be eligible
at the federal limit of 85 percent of the state median income level. However, most states have set their income caps
well below the federal ceiling (http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/cc98.htm).
23The Child Care and Development Fund is the major source of federal child care assistance for low- and
moderate-income families. The program provides funding to states to subsidize care of the parent’s choice, whether
in a family child care home, with a relative, or in a child care center.
subsidies to offset those costs.
22 This is for a family with one preschool-age child and one school-age
child. Without child care subsidies the families would gain little from working.
23 Under child care
subsidy programs, most families must pay a share of the cost, and the subsidy is income-conditioned.
This means that child care adds to already high marginal tax rates. Those families with younger children
(infants) are likely to face even higher marginal tax rates as the higher subsidies are withdrawn.
Requiring labor market participation of single parents with infants, when the costs of such care are equal
to about two-thirds of a full-year, full-time job, raises questions of efficiency and further complicates the
design of work incentives for the low-income population.
Recent evidence suggests that the picture presented in the diagrams may be more positive than is
actually the case for many of the families eligible for assistance. According to an October 1999 news
release by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, only 10 percent of children eligible for
federal child care assistance in 1998 received it. The percentage ranged from a low of 4 percent in
Mississippi to a high of 24 percent in West Virginia. Most states set limits below the federal maximums.
The report found that “There were approximately 10 million children eligible under state-set limits in
1998, of whom only 15 percent were served. At the federal maximum limit, 27 states are serving less
than 10 percent of eligible children, with the remaining states serving between 10 and 25 percent”
(http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/cc98.htm).25
24Some recent work has used state waivers as the basis of analyzing the labor force response to welfare
reform. See, for example, Moffitt (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999). The potential endogeneity of state policy
limits the usefulness of such studies for understanding the impact of the federal reform, however.
25The strong performance of the economy and the increase in the minimum wage are also likely to have
contributed to the observed decline in caseloads. See, for example, a report by the Council of Economic Advisers,
attributing about 35 percent of the decline to welfare reform, 10 percent to the macro economy, and 10–15 percent to
the increase in the minimum wage (Council of Economic Advisers, 1999).
26For more detail, see Cancian, Kaplan, and Meyer (1999) and U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (1999).
EARLY RESULTS UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM
To learn how recipients are faring under this new system, the traditional evaluation approach
would be to use a national data set, such as the Current Population Survey or the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, to model the parameters of the state rules in which the family resides and analyze
whether these parameters influence outcomes. Unfortunately, the TANF programs are so new that such
work is in the early stages.
24 We instead use state administrative data, which have the virtue of being
more rapidly accessible and avoiding certain selection problems in data reporting.
This evidence points to several conclusions.
• Receipt of cash assistance is down dramatically. Figure 7 provides an overview of the
AFDC/TANF caseloads over the period since 1987, using 1987 caseloads as the basis of
the normalization. The caseload decreased dramatically after 1996, when the federal
welfare reform was passed.
25 Wisconsin’s reforms prior to the federal legislation appear
to be reflected in the earlier and more dramatic decrease in that state.
• State studies of former AFDC/TANF recipients (“leavers” studies) suggest that 55–65
percent of former recipients have jobs about a year after exiting from AFDC/TANF;
35–40 percent are working full-time; perhaps 85 percent held a paying job at some time
during the first year, but about a quarter returned to AFDC/TANF cash assistance within
the first year.
26
• Among those who are working, average quarterly earnings are about $2,500, and
earnings drift up at about 8–10 percent a year for those who remain employed. This is
consistent with the poverty trap noted above. However, this average masks large
differences in quarterly earnings. For example, the most common industries of
employment among former welfare recipients in Wisconsin are retail trade, health
services, restaurants, and temporary agencies. According to Unemployment Insurance
(UI) records, average first-quarter earnings in these sectors were, respectively, $1,960,






























Notes: Wisconsin data: calendar year monthly average. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Economic Support Division;
U.S. data: federal fiscal year monthly average: Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families.
aMarch 1999 data.
FIGURE 7
AFDC/TANF Caseloads, 1987 - 1999, as a Multiple of the 1987 Caseload
a27
27Recent newspaper articles suggest another reason for low enrollment—reluctance by intake workers to
provide information to potential beneficiaries on where or how to apply.
28These families may have additional income from a variety of sources such as earned and unearned income
of other adult family members, earnings not subject to UI reporting and income from unreported activities
(underground economy activities).
29A study by Primus (1999) using Current Population Survey data for 1993–1997 suggests that the bottom
decile of the population has experienced a significant drop in income. For a description of those remaining on cash
assistance see, Danziger et al. (1999).
employment in temporary agencies tended to move to higher-paying jobs, especially
among those with limited education and little or no prior work experience.
• The majority of former recipients still have at least one family member covered by
Medicaid. This program provides either full coverage or no coverage. In contrast, fewer
than half of these families receive Food Stamps, a program whose benefit is reduced as
family income increases. Families that are eligible may only be eligible for small
amounts, and requirements for recertification of eligibility at frequent intervals may deter
claiming the benefit.
27
• In terms of income, early evidence suggests that about 60 percent of former recipients
have lower total income than they did while receiving AFDC/TANF. This analysis uses
the combination of AFDC/TANF, the purchase value of Food Stamps, and the EITC with
an adjustment for taxes. Perhaps 75 percent of these families live below the poverty line
in their first year off of welfare. Poverty is higher among larger families, who are more
likely to have experienced an income loss, because the cash assistance and Food Stamps
they received under AFDC/TANF are conditioned on family size, while earnings are
not.
28
In most states cash benefit levels have been reduced, and those remaining on the rolls have less
income than prior to reform. Some studies suggest that recipients continuing to receive aid are less able
to work than are those who left the rolls in terms of education, mental health, a history of abuse, and the
presence of disabled children.
29
TANF programs can be expensive. Their costs include direct benefit payments, administrative
costs, and costs of case management. A recent estimate in Wisconsin of the cost per family receiving
benefits, excluding case management, was $13,500 (verbal communication, John Tuohy, Wisconsin
Workforce Development). This reflects high administrative costs in areas with few recipients, and also
reflects the high costs of a program designed to bring individuals who have limited if any job market
experience into the work force.28
30Single individuals do not face these high rates, because they are eligible for only limited forms of
assistance, such as Food Stamps and a small EITC. Figure A6 shows the relationship between earnings and income
for such individuals. It shows that the marginal tax rate facing them ranged from .18 to .27; alternatively, their
incomes were considerably lower than the three-person single-parent family that received all assistance for which the
family was eligible.
An additional issue concerns spillover to others in the labor market; that is, has the rise in labor
force participation of former and potential welfare recipients had negative consequences on other low-
skilled workers? Figure 8 indicates that it has not, owing to the creation of jobs, low unemployment rates,
and increases in earnings among those in the lowest decile (see also Figure 9).
What then can be concluded from a review of the incentives of the new system and preliminary
evidence concerning the new system? The current U.S. programs, as designed by states and constrained
by the federal government, have not been successful in combining strong incentives to work with a safety
net that can eliminate extreme poverty and provide an adequate income for those who will never succeed
in the labor market. Federal law does permit states to allow up to 20 percent of their base-year caseload
to waive many work requirements. The difficulty facing states is how to distinguish those who truly
cannot succeed in the labor market from those who prefer not to work or to work only limited hours.
States have not found a way to discourage cash assistance while encouraging full use of such in-kind
benefits as Food Stamps. By deciding not to adopt a universal health insurance system, the United States
lessened the incentives to work under TANF. The need to reduce health insurance benefits as income
rises adds to high marginal tax rates. The decision to exempt from work requirements mothers who have
children less than 12 months old greatly increases the public cost of the “welfare” system and adds to the
difficulty of designing a system in which it pays to work.
30
Is it likely that a TANF recipient will have earnings over the long run that keep her in the area of
high marginal tax rates? Evidence from multiple sources all suggests yes. Table 4 indicates that white
non-Hispanic and black non-Hispanic women aged 18–24 who had 9–12 years of education and who
worked full-time, full-year had earnings of just under $12,000 in 1989. These earnings increased to onlyFIGURE 8





















































































































































































































% of Population Unemployment Rate
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, January 1999 <http://www.acf.DHHS.gov/news/stats/6090_ch2.htm> and U.S. Department of Labor, 1999, Labor Force Statistics from 
the Current Population Survey <http://stats.bls.gov/cpset.bs.htm>.FIGURE 9
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Source: CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups, calculations by Deborah Reed, Public Policy Institute of California.TABLE 4
Selected Labor Force and Earnings Profiles of White and Black Women, 1989
          9 to 12 Years of Education                        High School Graduate
a             
White Black White Black
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic
Women Women Women Women
Ages 18–24
% of those who worked < FTFY 80% 79% 57% 65%
Average annual earnings $3,848 $3,784 $5,725 $5,310
If work FTFY 11,974 12,099 13,272 12,837
Average hourly wage 5.62 5.68 6.26 6.07
Ages 25–29
% of those who worked less < FTFY 56% 58% 42% 47%
Average annual earnings $6,690 $6,166 $8,240 $7,906
If work FTFY 14,331 13,565 16,476 15,019
Average hourly wage 6.64 6.32 7.68  7.08
Ages 30–34
% of those who worked less < FTFY 51% 52% 43% 42%
Average annual earnings $7,166 $6,970 $8,330 $8,900
If work FTFY 14,444 14,091 17,834 16,269
Average hourly wage 6.97 6.60  8.27 7.65
Source: 1990 Census of Population and Housing. SSTF22 Earnings by Occupation and Education
<http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/earn-stateis.html>.
aIncludes GED.32
just over $14,000 among those aged 30–34. Women with a high school degree fared somewhat better:
among white women aged 30–34, mean earnings were nearly $18,000. The full-time, full-year earnings
of black women with a high school education was $16,269. In 1998 dollars, this is $23,443 among white
women aged 30–34, but only $21,385 among their black counterparts, $19,742 among those aged 25–29.
For those with 9–12 years of education, average earnings in 1998 dollars would be $18,986 among white
women aged 30–34. Women working fewer hours have far lower average incomes, as can be seen in the
table; these are the majority of working women with 9–12 years of education.
Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers for the third quarter of 1999,
as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), are $287 per week, or about $14,500 per year, for
women aged 25 and over with less than a high school diploma, and $409 per week, or about $20,000 per
year, for women of the same age group who are high school graduates
(http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/wkyeng.t04.htm). The BLS also has reported annual growth rates in real
hourly earnings over the years 1978–1995 among women aged 31–38 in 1998. For those lacking a high
school diploma, these rates were 2.9 percent at ages 23–27 and 0.9 percent at ages 28–32. For women
with a high school diploma, the rates were 3.3 and 2.9 percent, respectively
(http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/nlsoy.t05.htm).
Another piece of evidence comes from a study of former recipients of AFDC/TANF in
Wisconsin. Two groups of women were studied: those who left cash assistance in the third quarter of
1995 and those who left in the third quarter of 1997. In the first year after exit, the median leaver in 1995
had earnings (1998 dollars) in the range of $5,317 to $9,300; three years later the median remained in
this range. Among women with earnings, the median was in the range of $10,633 to $12,384 in the first
year after exit and $12,385 to $14,448 in the third year after exit. For women who left in 1997, median
earnings in the first year were $5,316 or less among all leavers and in the range $5,317 to $9,300 among
those with earnings. Table 5 gives a more complete picture of how the women who left cash assistance in33
TABLE 5
Earnings and Work Experience of Wisconsin Leavers in Three Years after Exit (1998 Dollars)
First Year Second Year Third Year
after Exit after Exit after Exit
All Leavers (4th Quarter 1995, N=8042)
Percentage with earnings 81.1 78.5 76.9
Among those working in year
Mean earnings $9108 $10294 $11450
Median earnings $8608 $9627 $10924
Mean number of quarters worked 3.0 3.2 3.3
Percentage continuously employed 66.2 69.7 71.1
Percentage continuously employed by same employer 42.4 44.7 45.3
Source: Cancian, Haveman, Meyer, and Wolfe (1999), from Table 3.34
1995 fared over the following three years. (For more on this population, see Cancian, Haveman, Meyer,
and Wolfe, 1999.)
We conclude that the majority of single women with children can expect to continue to face high
marginal tax rates even when they work full-time, full-year and increase their labor market experience.
To avoid high marginal tax rates, they must earn more than $10 per hour and work full-time, full-year.
When children requiring child care are present, most women need a wage rate of at least $15 per hour
and must work full-time, full-year to avoid these rates. The incentives now are clearly to work, but
working more or harder does not seem to pay.
Are there aspects of these programs conducive to achieving the goals of welfare reform? Several
components of state TANF programs seem to achieve efficiency with equity. These include the federal
EITC, which is supplemented in several states. (The data for Wisconsin incorporated its state EITC.) One
advantage of the EITC is that it is (or can be) targeted on a particular group, such as parents of dependent
children. A second advantage is that because it is an earnings supplement, it encourages work. A
disadvantage of its current form is that because it is targeted on lower-income groups, it must be reduced
as income rises, discouraging additional work effort.
The welfare reform policies in a number of states, including Wisconsin, provide a guaranteed job
opportunity for everyone in the program. This is likely to require public service jobs as a backup or
safety net for any system in which work is required. Any program that requires work as the basis of
earning the right to benefits must provide a job for all those who request a job. Public service jobs,
especially at times of high unemployment, may be the key to the success of work requirements.
Another positive component of state welfare systems is the use of skilled case workers to develop
a plan to help low-skilled individuals achieve job preparedness, to act as job placement agents, to help
arrange child care, and to assist recipients in applying for other assistance programs. This is part of the35
design of the Wisconsin program. Finding and training case workers who can do this is not an easy task,
yet such a system can greatly improve the outcomes of the policy and the lives of the clients.
An aspect needing careful consideration is the provision of targeted child care subsidies. In
addition to subsidies, some regulation of the quality of care statewide and an information network to
facilitate locating care may improve the functioning of the system and the well-being of children.
Combining direct subsidies with refundable child care tax credits may make care affordable and reduce
the disincentives associated with increased earnings. Expanding the current exemption beyond the first
12 months of a child’s life deserves consideration.
Another lesson to be learned from Wisconsin’s welfare reform is that temporary jobs may be a
useful transition into the work force for individuals without prior work experience. In temporary
placements individuals receive training in the world of employment and learn about the expectations of
employers. The experience of leavers in Wisconsin suggests that most move from temporary employment
into higher-paying positions within one year.3637
APPENDIX A
The Welfare System until 1996
The core of pre-reform assistance policy consisted of four awkwardly integrated programs targeted at
poor working-age families with children.
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (discontinued under welfare reform, replaced by
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF)
• Cash assistance to poor families with children headed by a single parent or guardian.
• AFDC provided family-size-conditioned cash income support to about 14 million people in
5.1 million families, or about 5.5 percent of the nation’s population. The support ranged from
$740 per month in Connecticut to less than $150 per month in Mississippi. Average benefits
had eroded over time from $704 per month in 1970 (1995 dollars) to $377 in 1995.
• AFDC penalized earnings. For every $1 increase in earned income over allowable
deductions, benefits were reduced by 67 cents initially. After four months, benefits were
reduced dollar-for-dollar with an increase in earnings. Thus the statutory tax rate on earned
income, or benefit reduction rate, for AFDC recipients was 67 or 100 percent, clearly
discouraging work.
• AFDC was an entitlement program; that is, if a family satisfied the eligibility condition(s) for
AFDC, then it received benefits according to the appropriate benefit formula.
• On average 55 percent of the cost of AFDC was financed by the national government.
• States administered the program, set benefit levels, and shared costs.
2. Food Stamp Program (continues under welfare reform, although changes were made to require
work and reduce eligibility, described below)
• Poor families are eligible for Food Stamps, which entitle the holder to purchases at
authorized food stores, depending on their income.
• The federal government pays for the Food Stamp Program, but the local offices
administering the AFDC/TANF program determine eligibility and amounts.
• In 1998, the Food Stamp Program provided about $16.9 billion in benefits or $170 per month
to the average recipient family. In that year, about 20 million of the nation’s population
received Food Stamp benefits. This is down from 25.5 million two years earlier (pre-reform).
• To be eligible, a family must pass an asset test and a net and gross income test. Net income
must not exceed the poverty line, equal to $13,880 in 1999 for a single parent with two
children, and gross income must not exceed 1.3 times the poverty line. A household is
limited to $2,000 in assets plus a car worth less than $4,650.
• Maximum Food Stamp benefits vary by family size and are reduced as family net income
increases. Net income includes AFDC/TANF benefits, and there are deductions for work
expenses, child care expenses, and shelter expenses.
• States generally require Food Stamp households to have their eligibility recertified every
three to 12 months.38
TANF Modifications to Food Stamp Program
• Under TANF, states may disqualify individuals from participation in the Food Stamp
Program for TANF violations.
• Under TANF, able-bodied adults without dependents who, during the preceding 36-month
period, received Food Stamp benefits for at least three months but worked less than 20 hours
per week are disqualified. Similarly, the act required the states to remove most permanent
resident aliens, who were previously eligible to receive Food Stamps.
3. Medicaid Program (continues under welfare reform, expanded to cover more children)
• Provides health care benefits to poor children (even those in two-parent families), single
mothers who receive AFDC/TANF benefits, and pregnant women. 
• The benefit package is quite generous, roughly equal to a private comprehensive package of
health insurance.
• Medicaid is administered by the states (again, largely through the local welfare offices),
which also bear some of the costs of the program, according to a matching formula.
• AFDC/TANF recipients losing eligibility because of increased earnings receive Medicaid for
an additional 12 months. However, after this period the adults lose all benefits unless income
remains below the cutoffs in effect in the state under AFDC.
• All states are now required to cover all children less than 6 years old with family income
below 133 percent of the poverty line, and all children born after September 1, 1993, with
family income below the poverty line. This change, which was made under AFDC, was
designed to reduce the negative work incentive effects of the tie between Medicaid and
AFDC.
4. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (continues under welfare reform)
• EITC works through the federal income tax. It is available to all low-income working
taxpayers but is targeted on those with dependent children. It is a refundable credit: If the
amount of a family’s credit exceeds its tax liability, the family receives from the Internal
Revenue Service a refund check for the difference. If a working family earns too little to owe
federal income tax but qualifies for the EITC, the IRS sends the family a check.
• Only those who work can qualify for the EITC. For families with very low earnings, the
value of the credit increases as earnings rise. The EITC operates effectively as a wage
supplement, lifting low-wage working families with children closer to, or in some cases
above, the poverty line.
• The benefit subsidizes annual earnings at a 40 percent rate up to about $9,500 for a family
with two children (for a credit of more than $3,000 per year). This maximum credit is
reduced as family earnings rise above about $11,500; no EITC is available for families with
income in excess of about $29,500.
• Increases in the EITC enacted in 1990 and 1993 provided a larger credit each year from 1991
through 1996 to qualifying families with children.
• A number of states enacted EITCs that supplement the federal plan.39
• The federal EITC was established in 1975 to offset the adverse effects of Social Security and
Medicare payroll taxes on working poor families and to strengthen work incentives.
The major provisions of welfare reform in the U.S. include:
 Eliminating the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, thereby eliminating
the right to public financial support when destitute.
 Reassigning fiscal and regulatory responsibilities for assisting the nation’s poor families from the
federal government to state and local governments.
 Providing a “block grant” to each state, paid for with money saved by eliminating AFDC, and
giving states wide discretion in the use of these funds.
 Imposing responsibilities on states for enforcing work—often full-time, year-round work—by poor,
often single-parent, families.
 Creating a new and less supportive environment in which poor families have to cope.
Federal requirements imposed on states by welfare reform:
 States must meet stiff goals in terms of the proportion of assisted families that have full-time
workers; for example, by 2002, 50 percent of all assisted one-parent families must have a worker
employed at least 30 hours per week.
 States are required to collect child support payments from noncustodial parents.
 States must impose rules that eliminate the provision of income support to any family after it has
received a total of five years of help.
 States must require that unmarried teen parents who receive help attend school and live with their
parents (or other adult supervisors).
 States must deny income support to anyone convicted of a drug-related crime, to mothers who
won’t identify the fathers of their children, and to legal immigrants admitted to the country after
August 1996.
Definition:
MOE – Maintenance of Effort: In enacting TANF, the U.S. Congress imposed an MOE obligation on
states, providing that a state would be penalized if it failed to maintain spending of at least 80 percent (or
75 percent if the state met TANF participation rates) of a “historic state spending” level each year.
Forms of Subsidy for Child Care:
1. Nonrefundable tax credit for taxpayers who incur work-related child care expenses. Maximum
amount goes to those at 140 to 160 percent of poverty line; $2.8 billion in 1998.
2. Block grants to states that can be used to subsidize child care for low-income parents who are
working or participating in work-related activities or education programs. Average federal subsidy
is $66 per week; total expenditure $2.9 billion in 1997.
3. Employers may exclude the provision of child and dependent care or employee contributions to
such care accounts from employees’ taxable income and Social Security earnings. Worth most to
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FIGURE A3
Indiana - TANF Parameters with Universal Health Coverage
a
aThe value of the coverage is not included in the income constraints.Earnings (1999 $)
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FIGURE A4
California - TANF Parameters with Universal Health Coverage
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FIGURE A5
Wisconsin - TANF Parameters with Universal Health Coverage
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